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Abstract 
 
Development aid is characterised by an inherent asymmetry 
between donor and recipient institution. Despite regular aid 
reforms and bold ambitions to change this relation, the 
asymmetry seems to persist. Inspired by post-development 
theory, and drawing on both a review of development theory 
and fieldwork within the World Bank, this article argues that 
the lopsided aid-relations are continuously being reproduced 
through the formation of development expert knowledge within 
authoritative donor communities. Here, contemporary 
knowledge/power formations shape and are shaped by 
historically embedded structures and epistemic communities 
that benefit the donor’s need for legible and operational 
knowledge. Hence, top-down approaches to development 
planning are reproduced at the cost of participatory, bottom-up 
ones, as per the official rhetoric.  
 
Keywords: development theory, discourse, post-development 
theory, World Bank 
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Introduction 
 
Power can operate in various ways. This article is about 
the discursive formation and power of international and 
institutional development. From the very inception of 
institutional development in the post-Second World War period, 
the era of development has come to manifest a seemingly 
hegemonic discourse shaped and spread by the West to the rest. 
This article draws on fieldwork from within the World Bank’s 
headquarter in Washington DC and seeks to couple and analyse 
this information with the institutional development discourse 
that has been manifested during the last half century and in 
which the World Bank is seen to be the prime gatekeeper. The 
argument is that there is a strong notion of trusteeship inherent 
to institutional development, and that the underpinnings of this 
trusteeship are continuously being reproduced in and through 
established systems of institutions, knowledge, and funding. 
These knowledge/ power formations configure and reproduce 
the international development apparatus despite the formal and 
official rhetoric stating the opposite, as suggested by the new 
aid architecture’s girding ideas of partnership, ownership and 
participation, which explicitly seeks to revamp inherent 
asymmetrical aid relations. The World Bank holds a 
gatekeeping position in international development, and just 
about all development actors globally relate, directly or 
indirectly, to World Bank policies and procedures. Hence, 
different, distinct and globally dispersed actors are shaped by a 
particular discourse emanating from one central node and 
operating on an abstract global level, but simultaneously 
reproduced by concrete transnational linkages between actors 
participating in the development apparatus. This article is about 
the conceptual elements of development and seeks to grasp how 
development works rather whether it works. 
 
Development and its Apparatus 
 
The concept of development is understood different from 
an outsider’s analytical perspective than from conventional 
practitioner perspectives. From an analytical perspective, the 
concept of development can be conceived of in two ways, as either 
reflecting immanent or intentional change (Cowen and Shenton 
1996). Whereas the former directs attention to the natural change 
and advancement of society over time, i.e. “…the transformation 
that moves towards an ever more perfect form” (Esteva, 1992: 8),1 
the latter denotes that this transformation, or development, 
necessarily needs to be directed and guided by someone – who 
already knows this perfect form – through active interference in 
                                                
1 The conception of immanent development originates from biology (cf. Estava, 1992). This view is highly 
associated with Adam Smith and his notion of ‘the invisible hand’, i.e., that the aggregate of individuals’ moral 
free choices would benefit society (1779).  
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society.2 The active intervention in a society (intentional change) 
is illustrated by the many projects implemented by development 
agencies, while development as a process that unfolds over time 
(immanent) is illustrated by e.g. the development of capitalism. 
Nustad argues that “[i]t was when development in the immanent 
sense was seen as creating problems that could be solved by active 
intervention, that intentional development was created” (2004: 14) 
and we saw the uprising of an international development apparatus 
that would gradually assume the monopoly to define both the 
problems and solutions to development.  
 Intentional change through development assistance is 
characterised by a donor–recipient relationship that binds 
together geographically detached actors with uneven material 
and conceptual resources. While a donor agency contributes 
with funding, technical aid and administrative guidelines, the 
receiving end is to do the implementation but also supposed to 
devise the plans and make policy decisions on how to spend the 
allocated funds. The latter is however not the usual case as 
development assistance always comes with certain strings 
attached so that the policy measures reflect the politics and 
intention of the donor rather than those of the recipient. This 
reflects the everlasting development debate about conditionality 
vs. participation. Participation first entered the development 
discourse from the 1980s and draws on an idea that the 
recipients themselves know best their own constraints and thus 
are best suited to make their own policy decisions (see 
Chambers 1995). The girding idea was that aid recipients’ 
participation in and ownership to policymaking processes 
would improve the appropriateness of externally funded 
projects and create local ownership in order to enhance local 
commitment and thus effectiveness. However, as private, 
bilateral and multilateral donor agencies are responsible to their 
respective constituencies, there is a need of tying aid to their 
own organisational values and making development assistance 
conditioned on their own policies. Conditionality denotes the 
means applied to enforce the adoption and implementation of 
donor’s policy.  “[C]onditionality is not an aim in itself but an 
instrument by which other objectives are pursued” (Stokke, 1995b: 
3),3 thus the donor’s conditionality represents an exercise of 
coercion having the rationale to pursue donor’s stipulated goals 
regardless of the ideas of recipient participation and bottom-up 
                                                
2 This view rose among positivistic scholars who asserted humans’ capability to take control over their future 
and development. This view is associated with the Saint-Simonians, who rejected the idea of progress as a 
natural non-intended process and instead proposed an idea about development as an active interference in society 
by its managers. August Comte enhanced these ideas in his promotion of rationality, planning and science, 
which have been labelled as positivism. 
3 Stokke also states that conditionality is “…basically a means to obtain a variety of objectives” (1995b: 3), and 
that the “…key element is the use of pressure by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually 
terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient” (ibid.: 11-12). Emphasis is put on the 
donor’s coercive aspects, “…to promote what the donor perceives to be in its own interests” (ibid.: 3). 
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planning. The conditionality–participation nexus thus represents 
a seeming paradox within the formal configuration of 
development assistance and reveals an intention on the donor’s 
side of establishing governance mechanisms to ensure its 
recipient follows the donor-established policies. This nexus thus 
merges the theory and rhetoric of participation with practices of 
conditionality, demonstrating how established discursive 
practices override new strategies, practices and ambitions.  
 
A Post-Structural Approach to Development 
 
When entering the 1990s ‘development’ laid with 
broken back. The end of The Cold War disbanded institutional 
development’s geopolitical aspects as development in many 
instances had been used to counter the spread of communism. 
Secondly, various studies pointed out that over four decades 
with development still hadn’t produced the desired results – 
there were almost a total lack of success stories. The continuous 
failure of development projects also triggered debates on 
development’s role and the vast spending of taxpayers’ money 
around the world. Development, which stood as the idea with 
the US as the ‘beacon on the hill’ (Sachs 1992) guiding post-
colonial and emerging nations now started to loose its popular 
founding. This scepticism got reflected in academic writing, and 
coupled with emergent post-modern thoughts a group of authors 
started to analyse development from a post-structural 
perspective.4 This perspective – which were to become known 
as post-development theory – started to analyse development as 
a powerful discourse, and the analytical focus shifted “[t]o the 
way in which discourses of development help shape the reality 
they pertain to address, and how alternative conceptions of the 
problem have been marked off as irrelevant” (Nustad 2004: 13). 
To get to grips with development practice and its mindset, post-
development scholars usually trace the genealogy of 
development and give emphasis to its initiation after the Second 
World War.5 By depicting development’s genealogy post-
developers illustrate how development constitutes a discourse 
where social meaning is produced and maintained, while 
diverging and contesting knowledge largely is ignored and thus 
has small pragmatic influence. Post-development scholars argue 
that development agents, institutions and policy-makers have 
legitimised, constituted and reproduced the development 
discourse rather than considering the critique frequently 
directed against it. Hence, development practice reproduces 
existing knowledge and the discursive formation of 
development.  
                                                
4 See for example Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1991, 1995; Cowen and Shenton 1996; Hobart 1993; Sachs 1992.  
5 Some trace the origin of the concept of development, and in particular intentional development, to the Era of 
Enlightenment and the school of positivism, the St. Simonians and August Comte (see Lie 2004).  
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Seeing development as a discourse came because 
development studies were in a crisis, and some intellectual 
circles declared the concept of development dead when entering 
the age of post-modernity. Pieterse argues that “[p]ost-
development overlaps with Western critique of modernity and 
techno-scientific progress” (2000: 176). As post-modernity is a 
cultural and intellectual rejection of modernity, post-
development is a rejection of development (Gardner & Lewis, 
1996). Scholars who adhere to the post-structural development 
critique take advantage in analysing development as a discourse 
in which development actors operate within and thus reproduce 
in practical development. Thus post-development theory 
position itself with an analytical distance outside the 
constraining structures of development. In doing this post-
development theory does not seek to present a solution to the 
problem of failed development and underdevelopment – which 
also is the main critique directed against this approach from 
practitioners working within the development apparatus. The 
strength of post-development’s discursive approach is that it 
allows one to distinguish between the moral aspects of 
development issues and the theoretical apparatus that has 
monopolised development discussions, solutions and 
interventions (Lie 2008; 2015a). As such, post-development 
perspectives aim not to provide policy suggestions, but to 
understand the social dimensions and knowledge/power 
formations of the system that do so.  
 
The Development Discourse 
 
Authors writing from a post-structural perspective tend 
to trace the origin of the development discourse as manifested 
in the current international development apparatus back to US 
President Truman’s inauguration speech January 20 1949, 
where he proclaimed that:  
 
“We must embark on a bold new programme for making the 
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of  
underdeveloped areas. … For the first time in history, humanity 
possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of 
these people. … The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign 
profit – has no place in our plans … Greater production is the 
key top prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production 
is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific 
knowledge” (cited in Porter, 1995: 66–67).  
 
According to Truman, development needed the modern 
technical and scientific knowledge the already developed 
nations possessed and who therefore had to share this with the 
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underdeveloped countries. The implementation and 
institutionalisation of Truman’s project became rooted in the 
Bretton Woods institutions, i.e. the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Funds (IMF) which were the results of 
the United Nations’ Bretton Woods meeting in 1944 on how to 
counter the elements that were seen as the Second World War’s 
triggers. Hence, the newly established multilateral institutions’ 
mandate “were to safeguard liberal capitalist global policies” 
(Preston 1996: 168). 
There are several interesting elements in Truman’s 
speech, which are reflected and sustained in later development 
practice and rhetoric. First, the speech represents the first time 
the term ‘underdeveloped’ was used in a formal setting, thus 
defining certain nations in a negative relation to the developed 
ones, having the effect of dichotomising ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
Second, it explicitly outlines what constitutes a developed 
society. Third, it stipulates how underdeveloped societies can 
become developed. Fourth, is says who to ascribe this task of 
developing the underdeveloped. Lastly, the speech defines what 
is ‘expert’ knowledge and the importance of disseminating it. 
Närman argues that “[w]hen Truman institutionalised 
development assistance, he could hardly have imagined that it 
would still exist in basically the same form fifty years later” 
(1999: 149). A weighty reason to this was because Truman’s 
ideas later got manifested and theorised in the American 
economist Walt Rostow’s “The Stages of Economic Growth. A 
Non-communist Manifesto” from 1960. Rostow’s theory was 
later to be labelled the modernisation theory, which proved to 
have long-lasting impact on development thinking and practice.  
 
Development as Modernisation  
 
Basic to Rostow and the modernisation school is that 
modernisation is an inevitable process and that Western 
modernity is the objective to be achieved on a global level. The 
thoughts of the modernisation theory draw on Adam Smith who 
two centuries earlier argued that economic growth and the 
wealth of nations are based on economic growth and a free-
market economy (cf. immanent development). Hence, the 
process of industrialisation came to play a key role in national 
modernist projects, and to Rostow an “…expanding industrial 
sector was the prime vehicle behind the stages of growth – the 
ultimate development process” (Nërman 1999: 151). The basic 
assumption of Rostow’s theory is that all nations inevitably 
develop in the same directions, following the same path having 
the same objective; i.e. a stage of mass-production and 
consumption, but that some nations lag behind on his five-stage 
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universal and evolutionary scheme.6 This is because the 
immanent process of progress has been obscured and thus he 
makes a call for active intervention by intentional development 
projects to assist and improve the progress of the failed 
immanent development.  
The modernisation theory is portrayed as an inevitable 
path unfolding over time in which all societies are passing 
through with different velocity. Societies are placed long a 
universal and linear continuum with the US as the model, or 
‘the beacon on the hill’, and it is the responsibility of those at 
the end of the scale to help others achieve the same level, 
because poverty was explained by nations’ lack of integration 
into the world market, which to the modern project is the litmus 
test of a society’s development. Development was thus seen as 
a uniform process supposed to be the same everywhere, thus 
neglecting contextual variations.  
The modernisation approach added one effect in 
addition to reproduce those already produced by Truman, viz. 
what Fabien (1983) calls ‘temporal segregation’. Temporal 
segregation denotes the phenomenon when contemporary 
political linkages between societies are cut of because a 
society’s poverty is explained with reference to it lagging 
behind on the evolutionary scale and not as a matter of relations 
between actors. Poverty is explained as a matter of historical 
development and that societies coexist isolated from each other. 
This non-relational conception of poverty was to be countered 
by the other paradigmatic development theory that has 
influenced global development thinking.  
 
Underdevelopment as Dependency 
 
The modernisation theory got its counter reaction in the 
1970s in what was to become known as the dependency or 
underdevelopment theory. Dependency theory counters the 
modernisation theory by explaining poverty as due to unequal 
structural and economic possibilities and relations between the 
North and the South. Hence it was relational and it did not only 
give an explanation to why some societies are poor, but also 
why some are rich. Inequality was due to structures established 
during the colonial era, which were sustained after 
                                                
6 In ‘The Stages of Economic Growth: a non-communist manifesto’ (1960), Walt Rostow stipulates five stages 
or phases the process of development consists of on the way to contemporary, western modernity: The first stage 
is the traditional society, or pre-Newtonian stage as Rostow calls it. Secondly is the ‘transitional stage’ where the 
conditions for “take-off” are developed. Thirdly and most crucial is the “take-off- stage”. This stage is short in 
time (about two decades) and is compared to the English revolution; characterised by rapid growth and 
expansion, being a period in which modernism is victorious over traditionalism. Stage four is ‘drive to maturity’ 
which no longer has industrialisation as a goal, but administrative and technological potential to produce 
everything they choose and want to produce. Fifth is the ‘stage of mass-consumption’, which, according to 
Rostow, had its break-through in the US in 1913–14 with Fordism. This stage was reached in Europe and Japan 
after WW2, through the Marshall help initiative. 
  Consilience 
 
84 
decolonisation. Whereas modernisation theory was apolitical 
and explained poverty in terms of (lack of) immanent historical 
progress, dependency theory was highly political. The theory 
rose from the works of Andre Gunder Frank (1967), who draws 
on Lenin’s theory of imperialism and Marx’ analysis of 
capitalist societies (cf. Gardner and Lewis 1996). The theory 
was initially embraced by people normally associated with the 
political left, and was ascribed academic credentials when 
Frank later was joined by Emmanuel Wallerstein (1974) who 
analysed the structural inequalities between North and South as 
a relationship between metropolis and satellites. The theory 
insisted on the coherence between underdevelopment, 
exploitation and political structures, describing 
underdevelopment as a political active process and not due to a 
partition in time. Where the modernisation school saw poverty 
as due to poor nations’ lack of integration in the world 
economy, the dependency theory saw it opposite around: that 
rich and poor countries are highly interconnected and that 
underdevelopment was caused by the poor nations’ factual 
integration in the world marked on unequal premises when 
compared to the wealthy nations. As a consequence, the 
dependency theoreticians argued that until these structural 
inequalities are altered, development would essentially remain 
an unequalising process: the rich nations get richer and the rest 
gets inevitably poorer.  
 
Some Comments on the Two Development Paradigms 
 
Modernisation and dependency theory have to a large 
extent been seen as poles apart in development discourse, but it 
is difficult to pinpoint what really distinguishes them in 
defining the central objectives of development (Närman 1999). 
The important dividing line is that while modernisation theory 
sees poverty as a historical problem caused by a slow immanent 
development process and thus makes a call for active 
intervention, dependency theory explains underdevelopment in 
terms of unequal structural and political relations between 
North and South. While “…modernisation seems to neglect 
inequality and conflicting agendas in the development process, 
these are crucial in dependency thinking” (ibid.: 157). However, 
dependency theory did not give a direct pragmatic solution on 
what to do except making a call for a total restructuring of the 
world economic order, which was seen as a too far-fetched and 
unlikely solution.  
Dependency theory was celebrated in representing input 
from the South (Frank is Mexican) to the South’s problems. 
Yet, the dependency theory did contribute to reproduce the 
schism between expert and local knowledge as the theory was 
just as alien to the poor rural farmers as the modernisation 
theory was.  
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Dependency theoreticians never managed to create a 
viable alternative to development practice and their theoretical 
predecessors. While dependency theory mainly got its 
resonance among political leftism and people engaged in 
research, modernisation theory continued to prevail among 
development practitioners. This was probably not based on a 
deliberate choice. Those engaged in the development sector are 
usually equated with radical mindsets and thus on the rhetorical 
level reproduce the mentalities of the dependency theory, most 
notably by adopting the term ‘underdevelopment’ which has the 
effect of dividing the world into two separate entities. 
Development practice on the other hand reflects notions of a 
paternalistic approach that reflect the structures of the 
modernisation theory. Despite new and continuously changing 
development rhetoric and policies, post-development scholars’ 
analysis illustrates that development practice to a large extent 
reproduces the basic notions and effects of the modernisation 
theory (Lie 2015b). Already in 1962 Renè Dumont argued that 
the change in rhetoric from the paternalistic concepts of ‘help’ 
and ‘aid’ to ‘co-operation’ is mere hypocrisy (referred in 
Närman 1999). The language of development rhetoric changes 
fast and development practice will always lag behind its 
rhetorical representations. Thus, some words lapse into oblivion 
while others persist and prevail whatever happens to the field’s 
reality and development practice. According to Chambers 
(1995), participation, which got its renaissance in the 1990s, is 
among those words: “So widespread is its use that some talk 
about a paradigm shift to participatory development” (ibid.: 30). 
Participation implies that the intended recipients of aid are 
supposed to do the planning and make the decisions. This 
paradigm shift was never reflected on the practical level of 
development – turning development upside down is too an 
ambitious alteration of the development apparatus, illustrating 
that development language does not necessarily reflect 
development practice. The conceptual development apparatus 
consists of lots of words that are widely used among 
development agents; still these conceptual representations are 
merely on the linguistic level and should not be taken as 
descriptive terms of development practice, which always lag 
behind the conceptual apparatus.  
 
Using the language of participation does not in itself constitute 
a transferal of power, nor any significant shifts in discursive 
practice. In referring to Porter (1995) Nustad argues that 
“…development since Truman has been the domain of 
technocrats, and with the construction of a technocratic 
discourse followed a denial of human agency” (2004: 21). The 
denial of human agency and the technocratic and discursive 
formation of development have contributed to establish an 
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apparatus highly reluctant to change with the effect of 
reproducing itself while also neglecting alternative knowledge 
and solutions. This kind of expert knowledge monopolises 
knowledge formations and thus generates ignorance towards 
other systems of knowledge (cf. Hobart 1993). Another aspect, 
thus, is how particular forms of knowledge – often introduced 
as ‘concepts’ – are not only shaping, but also shaped in and by 
their practical articulation in the nexus of culture, practice and 
policy (Lie and de Carvalho 2010; de Carvalho and Lie 2011). 
This reflects Foucault’s point about knowledge/power 
formations as discourses, in which post-developers draw. There 
is a parallel between Foucault’s writings about the court and the 
post-structural reading of development: “In the same way that 
the form of the court was the expression of a certain conception 
of justice, so the apparatus of development is … built on an idea 
of trusteeship … development therefore implies an idea of 
trusteeship: that someone who has the necessary vantage point 
guides the process of development… For this reason, proposals 
for reform look more like recapitulations of old efforts than true 
attempts at reform” (Nustad 2004: 21).  
It is difficult to implement a total reform of development 
practice. It is highly rooted in embedded mindset and structures 
evolving from over 50 years of development practice, which has 
contributed to reproduce the original existing system. Already 
from its inception, development was based on an understanding 
of an elite-driven process where some know and others do not. 
As the most important and influential development actor, while 
also being one of the few actors that have existed during the 
whole era of development, the World Bank provides a good 
empirical point to study how current notions of and discourses 
surrounding development are articulated and reproduced at the 
headquarters level in DC. 
 
World Bank Stories 
 
In the aula of the World Bank’s headquarters in 
Washington DC there is a statue of a young boy leading an old, 
blind man (see Lie 2015b; chapter three). The boy is holding the 
front end of a stick and the old man holds the back of the same 
stick. The statue was donated by a private pharmaceutical 
company (Merck Pharmaceutical Company) after Jimmy Carter 
got the medical company, various governments and the World 
Bank together at a WHO-conference where it was decided that 
the medical company should produce a medicine to counter 
river-blindness to be distributed by the various governments. 
World Bank was to cover the costs both in developing the 
medicine as well as producing it. Intentionally the statue was to 
symbolise the disease’s cruelty while also representing the 
helplessness and hopelessness of human conditions as the boy 
at the end of the stick knows that he one day will be at the other 
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end of the stick. Alongside the one in the World Bank’s lobby, 
there exist three similar statues where one is placed in WHO’s 
Geneva office, another at the Carter Centre and at the third at 
the pharmaceutical company. As the collaboration between the 
various actors on developing the medicine and curing the 
disease were successful, the statue has today become the 
symbol of cooperation founded on strong leadership.  
In late January 2005, three editorials – in The 
Washington Post (January 23), Financial Times (January 24) 
and The Guardian (January 25) – which all addressed the issue 
of whom to succeed James Wolfensohn as the president of the 
World Bank after his resignation taking effect June 1 2005. The 
Washington Post wrote that:  
 
 [i]t matters who takes over the World Bank, because the 
institution is both powerful  
and fragile. It is powerful because it pumps out around 
$20 billion in commercial  
loans, subsidized credits and grants each year and 
because its 10,000-strong staff represents the strongest 
concentration of development expertise anywhere. This 
combination of financial and technical muscles has given the 
bank a lead role in many ventures that affect American 
interests, from reconstruction in the Balkans and Afghanistan to 
the campaign against AIDS to the refining of development 
theory (emphasis added).  
 
January 26 James Wolfensohn held a speech to his staff 
in one of the larger conference halls in the World Bank. The 
objective of the meeting was to thank his staff for their efforts 
in collecting money for the 2004 Tsunami-victims and that it 
was good to see that the staff stood together in this hard period 
which affected many people working in the Bank. Also, as he 
was to travel extensively the coming months, he also took a 
temporary farewell with his staff as he soon was to retire. In 
celebrating his staff, Wolfensohn quoted The Washington Post-
editorial, giving emphasis to the part where his staff’s 
development expertise is highlighted. Furthermore, Wolfensohn 
said that among his main achievements during his decade-long 
tenure, was that he and his ‘development experts’ had changed 
the mode of doing development and that he had put up front and 
in the centre the idea that the Bank should “listen to our clients 
– not as policemen or professors – but as partners”.  So, how 
does a partnership work when one side of the partner 
comprising a donor–recipient relationship is addressed as 
clients – a term that indicates a patron and thus a partnership 
between a patron and client? What does it say about 
‘partnership’ with the world’s leading development agency? 
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Wolfensohn had at least three paramount contributions 
to the rearrangement of the international development apparatus 
through ‘reinventing’ the Bank, known as the Strategic 
Compact (Weaver and Leiteritz 2005). First was his ‘Corruption 
as the Cancer of Development’- speech which enabled the bank 
and its staff to work more explicitly on corruption than ‘rent 
seeking’ – which was the previous and more apolitical term for 
the same phenomenon. As a previous investment banker, 
Wolfensohn saw corruption to be among the worst impediment 
to growth and progress, and by opening up the space for the 
Bank to work with issues related to corruption, there was a 
major shift in Bank mentality turning into a more political 
agency. According to its mandate, the Bank is not supposed to 
be political – a mandate that was seen to hamper the Bank’s 
other dedicated role of alleviating poverty. Hence, Wolfensohn 
enabled the Bank to become more political in its activities, if 
not directly so at least indirectly by reconfiguring the methods 
applied of giving aid.7 This interlinks with his other major 
contribution, namely his launch of the Comprehensive 
Development Framework (CDF) – being a framework for 
development concerned less about what countries should invest 
their aid in, but rather how aid should be spent. This might be 
accounted for due to the policies of CDF, which includes an 
extensive list that in practice might legitimise all possible 
choices. The CDF was in 1999 manifested when the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was introduces by the World 
Bank as the guiding principle for aid partnership and giving 
development loans or credits. A PRSP is supposed to be devised 
by the recipient government and approved by the Bank and IMF 
in order for the country at stake to receive funds and to qualify 
to debt-relief. Via the PRSPs, governments were supposed to 
take control over their own development under the rationale that 
this generates ‘ownership’ and thus enhance the effectiveness of 
doing development. PRSPs were supposed to represent a shift 
from the top-down approach of the prevailing structural 
adjustment lending (SAP) method – where the Bank attached 
strict conditions to its aid – to a situation where recipients are to 
define their own agendas, thus shifting the responsibility of 
Bank-programmes from the Bank it self to its recipients. 
Coupled, addressing corruption more explicitly and 
emphasising how development aid should be spent represented 
a critical break with the Bank’s apolitical traditions and its 
apolitical mandate. Third and also interlinked was 
Wolfensohn’s statement that the World Bank is to become a 
knowledge bank, i.e. that it is supposed to produce knowledge 
                                                
7 Despite here described as indirect, it was still an intention on the Bank’s side to become more political. 
Knowing that the mandate is apolitical – a mandate which is printed on posters that hang in many of the Bank’s 
offices – it needed to become political in a subtle and indirect way. Hence, the indirectness is not the same as to 
say the Bank has political effects. As post-development scholars argue, development assistance has always had 
and will always have political effects.  
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to the betterment of recipient so that ‘they can make their 
decisions based on unbiased and scientific knowledge’ (see 
Pincus and Winters 2002). The Bank was just supposed to be a 
facilitator and helper of the recipient when they were to devise 
their CDF by providing knowledge. However, as knowledge 
might take various forms and there is several power aspects 
attached to knowledge formation, it is not irrelevant what kind 
of knowledge that is produced within the Bank and thus shapes 
the institution’s external representation and activities.  
 
Comprehensiveness and Politics 
 
The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) 
gives emphasis to governance issues. A clean government, that 
is one without corruption and where administrative and 
bureaucratic routines follow stipulated guidelines, is seen as the 
main vehicle for development. Alongside this, the CDF 
prioritises an effective justice system as essential for fighting 
corruption, and a good, healthy and properly supervised 
financial system. These elements are all essential to the new 
approach to states and governments as recipients of 
development assistance and credits from the multilateral 
financial institutions. Comprised, these new elements make up 
what is labelled as ‘good governance’, which is a cluster of 
policies representing the latest paradigmatic shift in post-
Second World War development discourse (cf. Orlandini, 
2003). The sudden rise of good governance policies and how 
this policy package is disseminated and circulated in the 
development apparatus’ conceptual toolbox, illustrates World 
Bank’s rather hegemonic role in defining obstacles to 
development while at the same time delivering policies and 
solutions to these development problems. From the World 
Bank, a weak government was seen as a major obstacle to 
development; hence good governance became the major means 
to and objective of development (see Kapur 2002).  
 
Whereas the era of structural adjustment, particularly the 1980s 
and early 1990s, was characterised by a significant top-down 
approach from the World Bank in its relation to its lenders, the 
CDF and PRSP intended to turn this relationship upside-down. 
Recipient governments were now supposed to be in charge of 
devising their own poverty reduction plan based on own 
priorities and needs as opposed to previously when 
development grants came with strong strings attached so that 
the policies pursued reflected the interests of the donor-
institutions more than the receiving governments’ needs. 
Instead of being subjected to strict conditionalities through 
structural adjustment programmes, the governments were now 
themselves to decide how to spend their loans. This transition 
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indicates a change in the modality of how aid is given and how 
aid is expected to work. ‘Empowering’, ‘emancipating’ and 
enabling the recipients to themselves be in charge of the process 
had the objective of bringing the decision-making process 
closer to those it affected and were based on the rationale of 
stimulating ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’ in order to make 
development assistance more effective – as efficiency and 
effectiveness have always been among the prime motors of 
reshaping development policies and systems. Instead of the 
donors dictating what the money should be spent on by 
claiming their knowledge of the correct path of progress, it was 
now supposed to be in the hands of national authorities to come 
up with their own plan – which had to be approved by the 
donors. These elements illustrate a seeming shift in the general 
disbursement tactics, giving aid recipients greater freedom and 
control. But as development assistance always comes with 
certain strings attached, this shift represented more a rhetorical 
then a practical shift regarding both the policy content and the 
way of organising development. Instead of “you get the money 
if they are invested in this and that (i.e. structural adjustment 
policies)” it is now “you get the money of you have done this 
and that”. Funding was now to be given on previous 
achievements and results, and the funding was to cover further 
strengthening of these processes when there exist commitment 
from the national authorities’ side. Precisely because the 
governments need approval for the PRSPs from the donor-
institutions, there is an asymmetric power-relation implicit in 
this mode of organising the partnership. Those in IMF and 
World Bank responsible for accepting the PRSPs know what 
they want, and those producing a particular PRSP know what 
the donors desire.  
 
 
The Knowledge Bank: a Battlefield of Knowledge 
 
From the 1970s, the Bank sought to redefine its identity 
from being an international financial institution to become a 
global development agency. From the late 1990s, it started to 
think of itself as a knowledge bank, and production and 
dissemination of Bank-knowledge increased rapidly. This is 
also reflected in the reorganisation of the Bank’s internal 
structures – also among Wolfensohn’s achievements during his 
tenure. The agency was reorganised for knowledge management 
creating ‘knowledge-based communities’ and thematic 
networks (King and McGrath 2004). The restructuring of the 
Bank revolved around producing a matrix where different 
sectoral divisions produce knowledge about its own thematic 
area which they are supposed to transfer into the various 
regional defined operational units who ultimately brings this 
knowledge into Bank projects. “The knowledge bank would no 
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longer enforce policy change through conditionality but would 
instead teach poor countries how to transform themselves, 
encourage participation in the process of change through 
partnerships, and encourage commitment and ‘ownership’ 
through the vehicle of CDF” (Pincus and Winters 2002: 12). 
The Bank produces knowledge it desire to disseminate to its 
lending countries so that these eventually will incorporate the 
Bank knowledge and later make decisions based on it. This also 
illustrates the transferral of responsibility: instead of the Bank 
telling recipients what to do, recipients are supposed to know 
what to do themselves and thus secure local ownership to the 
processes. However, ownership is not an easy thing to grapple 
with as the recipient institutions need to state themselves what 
the donor wishes to hear. As a donor-informant put it: 
“ownership exist when they do what we want them to do but 
they do so voluntarily” (Randel, German and Ewing 2002: 8). 
Making ‘them’ do as ‘we’ want is dependent on knowledge 
transferal, and consequently it matters what kind of knowledge 
that is disseminated.  
Internal to the Bank there is a great multitude of 
knowledge. This was quite prevalent during my fieldwork 
within the Bank in January and February 2005. It is difficult to 
grasp the vast and complex field of an institution containing 
around 10.000 employees, but some trends are more significant 
than other. Despite having the possibility to meet a variety of 
staff, I was primarily connected to the social development 
branch of the Bank, which is located in the larger 
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development 
(ESSD). This department has the key role of being an anchor’ 
of the Bank’s work on social development and seeks to 
disseminate its knowledge about social issues and social capital 
into the Bank’s operational branches. Many employees 
expressed difficulties doing this, because they felt they were not 
taken as that important when addressing the ‘operations’. On 
the operational side they were more stressed by those seeking to 
infer in their work, and “particularly are those from the social 
development at times very busy in our corridors. It is somewhat 
annoying. I know they are doing their job, but let us do ours. 
We know what is important and what’s not”, as one informant 
working in operations put it. On the sector side, an informant 
said: “Well, we are supposed to be an anchor, and be available 
with resources whenever the operations need us. But they never 
consult us. We therefore need to address them directly. If not 
because social development issues are important, so at least 
because we need to make ourselves relevant to secure further 
funding of our department”.  
Despite being two isolated quotations from a long 
fieldwork, these do nevertheless reflect the major trends of the 
‘battlefield of knowledge’ (Long and Long 1992; Lie 2012) 
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internal to the Bank. The Bank as a knowledge battlefield is 
most prevalent in its operational branches and in ‘the field’, i.e. 
at its country offices located in the various recipient countries. I 
conducted eight months fieldwork in Uganda (in addition to the 
two in the World Bank), focusing on the government–donors-
nexus of the policy process – a fieldwork which also reflects 
how people in operations are under constant press from various 
interest groups or Bank-sectors seeking to have their voice 
heard and their issues reflected in the final policy documents. 
For instance, within the Bank those working for the various 
thematic networks spearheading new development thinking 
talked about their ideas and policies in market terms, i.e. that 
they had to ‘sell’ their ideas to the operational side of the Bank 
to become relevant and make a difference. In such processes, 
converting ideas and policies to please and fit the existing 
operational demands also meant subverting the original intent of 
these ideas. Those pioneering new policies and initiatives thus 
usually turned into pragmatic aid practitioners when seeking to 
influence operational activities. Similar ‘knowledge battlefields’ 
occurs also in the interface between donor and recipient 
institution, between the Bank and its clients, where existing 
practice and operational demands tend to trump new and 
alternative perspectives regardless if these emerge from the 
recipients themselves or from within the Bank (Lie 2015b).  
  However, even though operational activities are the 
central node to understand the knowledge encounters of 
development, these encounters are not solely between 
operations and the social development family. The great divide 
goes between various systems of knowledge internal to the 
Bank. One the one hand there is the knowledge reflected in the 
social development family, which could be classified as 
complex, qualitative, local and contextual, fragmented, 
irrational, and empirical. On the other hand is the knowledge 
that spans around the Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management (PREM) network. This is probably the most 
influential sector of the Bank and close to all PREM-staff are 
economists. This sector’s knowledge could be characterised as 
legible, rational, straight lines, quantitative, causal and 
theoretical. Whereas the former system of knowledge is 
dedicated to long-term thinking, the latter predicts short-term 
thinking and results. This finding is also reflected in David 
Mosse’s work, who also, as an anthropologist, conducted 
fieldwork within the Bank:  
 
“The Bank is an organisation dominated by economists and 
economist paradigms. The framing goals, the definition and the 
measurement of development success all derive from economic 
frameworks, and the discipline is privileged in the Bank’s 
career structure and in its streams of promotion” (Mosse 2004: 
2).  
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Legible Planning 
 
Despite just about all Bank-staff emphasis the 
importance of the social aspects of development knowledge, 
people engaged in this sector express difficulties of achieving 
any substantial influence whereas those working in PREM 
acknowledge that the Bank is “mainly concerned with growth 
and economic management” – as an economist at the Bank’s 
Uganda country office expressed it. The problem of making 
social development aspects relevant to the Bank’s planning, 
policies and operations is precisely due to the means and 
methods applied in planning: there is a great need for straight 
lines, legible knowledge and causality. It would be difficult for 
the Executive Directors at the Bank to plan and make decisions 
on a knowledge that is not portrayed as universal and causal, 
and that lacks two straight lines under the stipulated objectives 
in the end of a project document. Development planning is 
essentially about producing causality between input and 
expected output, and intervention becomes a question of 
straight lines and transparency, hence what is local and complex 
are simplified and standardised. “Planning relies on 
simplifications and the production of legible units. The larger 
and more ambitious the plan is, the more reductionistic and 
simplistic planning becomes, and the more of the ethnographic 
particularism it tries to grasp is missed in its representations” 
(Lie 2004: 140–141). It would not be possible for World Bank 
staff to deliver a project proposal to its Board of Directors that 
states that the world is complex which needs to be taken into 
account when planning without giving any guarantees of short-
term success. As Scott (1998) shows, planning and intervention 
always tend to neglect the social and complex local knowledge, 
or metis which is the practical knowledge only acquirable 
through lived life, and experience and impossible to codify.  
The Bank’s need to establish causality between 
intentions, plans, input and expected output minimises the 
influence of the social development knowledge because a 
particular knowledge’s complexity is reduced in symmetrical 
relation to the higher up in the Bank hierarchy knowledge is 
disseminated and circulated. The closer knowledge moves from 
researchers to decision-makers, the more the economic 
rationality seem to prevail over more complex and illegible 
knowledge. This is not to say that some kind of anthropological 
knowledge – or other kinds of knowledge deriving from the 
social sciences – is ‘better’ in terms of policymaking and 
development on a normative standard. The above argument is 
merely to illustrate how planning works, why it is plausible to 
argue on the Bank’s knowledge-heterogeneity and as a 
battlefield of knowledge on the inside. Externally, the Bank 
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appears homogenous, which is a direct result on the means, 
methods and knowledge applied in planning. The result is that 
one observes a highly monolithic and standardised development 
apparatus being quite reluctant to change. As Green argues, 
with reference to Arce (2000) and Ferguson (1994): 
 
“…while the standardization of development globally is partly a 
function of the standardization of development problems and 
solutions, …it is also a consequence of the kinds of practices 
used to plan and implement development as a process of 
transforming policy visions into manageable realities through 
the social constitution of ‘projects’ subject to specific 
techniques of audit, organization and control” (2003: 123–4). 
 
Turning Development Cooperation Upside-Down? 
 
Despite good intentions of letting the recipient 
participate more in the process of devising development plans 
concerning themselves, this never really materialised. CDF and 
the introduction of PRSPs as the guiding policy instrument did 
not enhance recipient actors’ ownership and participation over 
the process – at least not regarding the final outcome. 
Recipients were to devise their own PRSP documents and the 
Knowledge Bank was intentionally only supposed to help 
facilitate the process. As argued above, knowledge is never an 
unbiased objective entity – it is always positioned and shaped 
by its purpose. Staff in the operational units of the Bank argued 
that it would be better if the Bank still had been in full control 
over the process of devising poverty reduction plans as it would 
be much more effective and time-saving, “after all, we are to 
approve the documents, and surely we won’t approve anything 
that deviates from our interests”, as a Bank-staff put it. Several 
at the Bank argued that it would be better if the Bank made the 
plans itself, as it is “too much dialogue and negotiations” in 
letting the recipient produce the papers. On the Uganda-side, a 
senior official at the Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development stated: “surely there’s an imbalance in 
our relationship with the Bank. We are acutely aware that we 
need to produce what the Bank likes and what we think the 
Bank will approve. … Basically, it is because we need the 
money”. Despite recipients and lending government are to 
produce the mandatory papers to release World Bank funding, 
this has not altered the relationship in any substantial way. The 
Bank still defines, though more indirectly, the desired 
knowledge and policies.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Formally, the changes in the international development 
apparatus deriving from the World Bank had the intention of 
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altering the paternalistic legacy of previous means and methods 
of doing development by turning it upside down. The intention 
was to ‘put the recipient agency in the driver’s seat’. The shift 
from the top-down approach of structural adjustment lending to 
a seemingly more bottom-up and inclusive process of the 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), with its 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) as the guiding 
documents, has not managed to alter development practice in 
any significant way. The World Bank is still the leading, 
gatekeeping agency for both development policy and 
procedures, despite its self-imposed reorganisation giving aid 
recipients the freedom and responsibility to devise their own 
policy. The recipient’s freedom is, however, truncated by 
mechanisms implied by the reorganisation itself. First, the aid 
recipient knows it has to align with the Bank’s knowledge 
regime when devising its own policy in order to have it 
accepted. Second, and related, the Bank seeks to make its own 
policies those of the recipient as a way to limit knowledge 
discrepancies between the Bank and its counterpart. This 
illustrates a new power formation at play, organising and 
reproducing development practice. The seemingly consignment 
of power has only had the effect of making the recipient 
responsible for the Bank’s policies. Current development 
practice still reflect the patrimonial legacy of the modernisation 
theory, but now in a more subtle manner: it is no longer stated 
explicitly that the donor knows what is best or not – recipients 
are those who are supposed to do and plan development 
initiatives. As these initiatives need Bank-approval, the Bank 
and its knowledge system still prevail in international 
development discourse reproducing the effects deriving from 
Truman’s 1949 speech, i.e. the schism between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
and between expert and local knowledge, as well as the faith in 
an active, intentional interference in society to guide and 
improve what is seen as unilinear and immanent processes. 
The World Bank plays a key gatekeeping role in 
international and institutional development. Through its central 
node in Washington DC, and supported by various detached 
nodes, i.e. country offices, around the world in addition to the 
fact that just about all development agencies worldwide relate 
to the Bank’s paradigmatic input to the global development 
discourse, the Bank as an actor and development as a discourse 
represent “…as a bureaucratic force with global reach and an 
explicitly pro-capitalist agenda, operating as a tool of regimes 
that seek to perpetuate relations of inequality and dependence 
between the West and the rest and, through their representation, 
to perpetuate the construction of others as post-colonial 
subjects” (Green, 2003: 124, emphasis added). 
It seems difficult to escape business as usual – culture 
eats strategy for breakfast. Development is highly embedded in 
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its own discourse and development practice only seems to 
reproduce the very same discourse despite intentions on the 
donor-side of altering systemic aspect of development 
cooperation. That development practice seems to reproduce 
itself is thus due to both the discursive power of development 
and the technocratic operations of bureaucracies. Both are 
contingent on the combination of a particular set of knowledge, 
that together contribute in maintaining a form of asymmetrical 
trusteeship that the development apparatus formally seeks to 
escape.  
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